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STUDENT NOTES/COMMENTS
Lost at Sea: Rescuing Cruise Line




For most, waiting in line to board a cruise-ship represents the
beginning of an extravagant vacation that includes crossing the
Caribbean with a beach towel in one hand, daiquiri in the other,
and a view of the ocean only obstructed by sunglasses. But stand-
ing in line to board a cruise-ship represents a very different begin-
ning for the people who serve the passengers that daiquiri, or
wash that beach towel. For these crewmembers, often hailing from
Central or South America, and Eastern Europe, standing in line
marks the beginning of an extraordinary opportunity to provide
for their families by working at sea. As each foreign crewmember
makes it to the front of the line, the momentary glance at the
employment contract presented to them, often in a language they
cannot read, will be the least memorable part of this exciting expe-
rience. But for an unlucky few, this forgettable experience will
have startling repercussions on their rights in United States
courts.
Regidor Lagarde was one such crewmember.1 On his first day
of work, Lagarde found himself in line with the rest of the crew, a
collection of nationalities, all seeking a new life working on the
open seas.2 Waiting before the looming cruise-ship, Lagarde’s
mind was with his family in an impoverished Filipino community.
With little education, or grasp of the English language, Lagarde
had left the Philippines to work on a cruise-ship to support his
a1 J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to
thank Tanya Meister-Griffith for the incredible guidance she provided in the
construction of this article, and Professor Michael Karcher for the direction he
provided. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their constant support,
and for the time spent discussing this article.
1. Lagarde Aff. ¶¶ 1, 4.
2. Id. at ¶ 6.
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family.3 Upon reaching the front of the line, he signed his employ-
ment contract as he was instructed to do, and as he had watched
fellow crewmembers do.4 Forced to sign in a hurry with no oppor-
tunity to read the contract or ask questions, Lagarde and the
others could only agree to the contract.5 Given no opportunity to
modify or negotiate, the crewmembers had only the choice to sign
or be left in a foreign country with no employment.6 Further,
Lagarde was not provided a contract in his native tongue. Given
only an English version, the contract included words such as
“arbitration,” that he could not read or understand.7 With no com-
prehension of his rights, or those that he had just waived, Lagarde
began a long career working as a waiter on cruise ships, until he
suffered a severe injury on the job that would require back sur-
gery.8 Like countless other foreign crewmembers, Lagarde was
startled to learn that amongst provisions he was neither able to
understand, nor given time to read, the word “arbitration” would
foreclose his ability to recover in a United States courtroom, under
United States law. Without the protection of United States law,
Lagarde’s struggle left him handicapped, unable to gain employ-
ment, and without compensation: the standard result for a foreign
crewmember injured at sea.
Under maritime law, modern seamen enjoy tremendous legal
protections specifically implemented to counteract the difficult
conditions and bargaining power available at sea. In the United
States, the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, more commonly referred
to as the Jones Act, provides specific methods of recovery for
employees injured while working as seamen. Unlike most other
professions, under the Jones Act, sailors are permitted to bring
negligence actions against their employers; a codified illustration
of the historic protections that have long been provided to sailors.9
Further, Congress enacted this statute to “provide liberal recov-
ery”10 for sailors, and adopted a “lower showing of proximate cause
than would be required in a non-admiralty case.”11 In a recent case
regarding causation under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
3. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 13, 14.
4. Id. at  ¶ 6.
5. Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.
6. Id.
7. Lagarde Aff. ¶¶ 13, 14.
8. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 16, 17.
9. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2008).
10. Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
11. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1295 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett,
J. dissenting).
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(FELA), the Supreme Court affirmed this standard, explaining
that a plaintiff must only show the employer’s negligence “played
a part—no matter how small—in bringing about the injury.”12
Similarly, under United States common law, an injured seaman is
also provided “maintenance and cure,” which demands that the
employer of such a seaman provide all living and medical
expenses for his crewmember until that crewmember has recov-
ered from said injury, or reached maximum medical improvement
(MMI).
While the cruise industry often provides foreign seamen
exceptional opportunities to earn money both for themselves and
their families, the employment contracts crewmembers sign can
turn this dream into a nightmare. Recently, the cruise industry
has begun including foreign arbitration and choice of law clauses.
Upon signing these clauses, seamen such as Lagarde agree that
any case or claim that arises from their employment must be arbi-
trated outside the United States, usually under the laws of a dif-
ferent nation. Typically, arbitration occurs in the nation that the
seaman hails from, under the laws of the flag-state of the cruise
ship on which the seaman works. As nearly 90% of commercial
vessels calling on U.S. ports fly a foreign flag, the majority of
cruise-ships are not registered in the U.S.13 Therefore, forced to
seek recovery outside the United States, under foreign law, for-
eign crewmembers are denied the protections of the Jones Act and
“maintenance and cure,” because the laws under which they must
arbitrate do not provide similar protections.
Although foreign arbitration clauses have deprived the rights
of all foreign crewmembers employed in the United States, the
problem has become especially acute in the cruise industry, which
employs a large number of foreign crewmembers and has almost
universally implemented such clauses in its contracts.14 In 2011,
12. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 2644 (2011) (citing Rogers v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1957)).
13. Maritime Industry Background, CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
INC., http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/resources/maritime-industry-background
(last visited Jan. 15, 2013); Why are cruise ships registered in foreign countries?, USA
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/cruises/2012/12/11/why-are-cruise-
ships-registered-in-foreign-countries/1760759/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (indicating
that only one major cruise ship is registered in the United States, and that most large
carriers’ ships are flagged in the Bahamas, while Panama, Bermuda, Italy, Malta and
the Netherlands are also popular).
14. See Aggarao v. MOL Shipping Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir.
2012) (enforcing a foreign arbitration clause in the employment contract of a Filipino
seaman employed on a cargo vessel).
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the cruise industry generated $40.4 billion of revenue, employing
347,787 workers.15 Florida serves as the center of the cruise indus-
try within the United States, with more than 60 percent of cruise
passengers departing from a Florida port, and three-fourths of the
industry headquartered in South Florida, including Carnival Cor-
poration & plc., Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., and Norwegian
Cruise Line all within Miami-Dade County.16 With such a large
portion of the industry operating out of South Florida, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has
become the epicenter for crewmember injury claims. However,
under the Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinions, the cases of foreign
crewmembers do not remain in the Southern District Court for
long. Instead, all of these cases follow nearly an identical progres-
sion. Most foreign crewmembers, seeking a jury, file in Florida
state court. From there, the cruise lines will remove the claim to
federal court, under admiralty jurisdiction. There, they will move
to compel arbitration in accordance to the crewmember’s employ-
ment contract, to a different country, under different law. At this
point, the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Circuit demands that the
District Court grant arbitration. Routine as clockwork, this pro-
cess acts as a one-way ticket to arbitration for any foreign cruise
line crewmember hurt on the job.
By enforcing the arbitration clauses included in the employ-
ment contracts of foreign seamen like Lagarde, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has instructed its lower courts that the modern policy of
favoring foreign arbitration clauses outweighs the centuries old
protections that have been afforded to seamen. By compelling
arbitration on this historically protected class, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and its sister circuits have discarded the words of Justice
Story that have dictated the claims of seamen since our nation’s
founding; that seaman are the “wards of admiralty.”17 Although
the now defunct reasoning employed in the Eleventh Circuit’s case
of Thomas v. Carnival Corp., and the “prospective waiver” doc-
trine may yet again provide relief for Lagarde and his peers, there
remains an alternative that the courts have not yet substantially
considered.18 This alternative would demand the exportation of
15. The Contribution of the North American Cruise Industry to the U.S. Economy
in 2011, BREA BUSINESS RESEARCH (prepared for “Cruise Lines International
Association, August 2012), 46-47 available at http://www.cruising.org/sites/default/
files/pressroom/2011EconomicStudies/EconStudy_Full_Report_2011.pdf.
16. Id. at 54-55.
17. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (Story, J.).
18. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009).
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the protections granted to FELA railway workers to find that arbi-
tration clauses are unenforceable against Jones Act seamen. How-
ever, while the Eleventh Circuit continues to favor arbitration
over centuries of judicial and legislative treatment of seamen as a
protected class, seamen like Lagarde will continue to suffer the
very fate that Justice Story warned of in 1823.
The purpose of this article is to illustrate the inequitable
result of the Eleventh Circuit’s position to favor international
arbitration clauses at the expense of the longstanding judicial pre-
cedent to treat seamen as a protected class. Additionally, this arti-
cle will examine possible developments in the current law that the
court could employ to return statutory rights to Lagarde and his
peers. Part II(a) provides a glance at the judicial practice of treat-
ing seamen as a protected class that has been consistently reaf-
firmed by the Supreme Court. Conversely, Part II(b) offers a
background on arbitration and the two-part analysis that courts
have applied in challenges to such agreements. Part II(c)-(d)
examines the key decisions of the Eleventh Circuit that preceded
that court’s decision in Lindo v. NCL, the case addressed in Part
III. Finally, with this background in place, Part IV endeavors to
critique potential legal developments and ultimately endorses the
application of particular provisions of FELA to return the Jones
Act protections that foreign cruise line crewmembers have been
deprived.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Seamen: The Protected Class
The tradition of the United States judiciary to regard seamen
as a legally protected class dates to the infancy of the nation. In
1823, the revered Justice Story pronounced a “great public policy
of preserving [seamen as an] important class of citizens for the
commercial service and maritime defence of the nation.”19 Such
treatment can be traced to the ancient history of English common
law. The Supreme Court has long recognized that both U.S. and
English law treat seamen “as if they needed the protection of the
law, in the same sense that minors and wards need the protection
of parents and guardians, and hence have been often described as
‘wards of admiralty.’”20 The Court has recently reaffirmed the
importance of this special treatment:
19. Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 483.
20. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 298-99 (1897) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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Justice Story identified this animating purpose behind the
legal regime governing maritime injuries when he observed
that seamen “are emphatically the wards of the admiralty”
because they “are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to
sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils,
and exhausting labour.” Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480,
485, 483 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823). Similarly, we stated in
Wilander that “[t]raditional seamen’s remedies . . . have
been ‘universally recognized as . . . growing out of the sta-
tus of the seaman and his peculiar relationship to the ves-
sel, and as a feature of the maritime law compensating or
offsetting the special hazards and disadvantages to which
they who go down to sea in ships are subjected.’”21
This doctrine has not been lost to history, and as recently as 2009,
the Supreme Court recognized the great protections afforded to
seamen.22
More recently, this precedent has seemingly lost its luster in
the Eleventh Circuit. There, a line of cases has developed regard-
ing crewmember arbitration that permits the cruise industry to
trample the statutory rights of its foreign crewmembers. However,
before delving into the Eleventh Circuit’s controversial rulings, it
is important to consider where the competing interest of favoring
foreign arbitration derives.
B. The New York Convention and the Federal
Arbitration Act
The application of foreign arbitration in the U.S. began in
1925, when Congress first enacted the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”).23 The FAA implemented a pro-arbitration policy, compel-
ling the enforcement of freely negotiated arbitration agreements,
with certain restrictions.24 The U.S. became a party to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
21. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104, 66 S.Ct. 872, 882, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946) (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting)).
22. See Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
23. Jarred Pinkston, New York’s Unwelcoming Harbor: The New York
Convention’s Inapplicability to Claims Arising From Seamen’s Employment, 3 B.Y.U.
INT’L L. MGMT. REV. 233, 233 (2007).
24. Id.; see also Justin Samuel Wales, Beyond the Sail: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Thomas Decision And Its Ineffectual Impact on the Life, Work, And Legal Realities of
The Cruise Industry’s Foreign Employees, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1215, 1226 (2011)
(noting that the FAA was passed with the hope that it would place private arbitration
agreements within employment contracts on “equal footing with other contracts”)
(citing Matthew Nickson, Closing U.S. Courts to Foreign Seamen: The Judicial
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL106.txt unknown Seq: 7 12-FEB-14 10:29
2013] LOST AT SEA 177
eign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), which was subse-
quently enacted in 1970 by the Convention Act.25 Both the FAA
and the Convention Act have been codified in Title 9 U.S.C., chap-
ter 1 containing the FAA, and chapter 2 containing the Conven-
tion Act.26 Under the New York Convention and later Supreme
Court precedent, foreign arbitration has enjoyed an “emphatic fed-
eral policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”27 Under the
Convention Act, Article II(3) provides that a court may refer par-
ties to arbitration at the request of one party when such an agree-
ment has been made providing for arbitration.28 “This obligation
does not arise, however, (i) if the agreement ‘is null and void, inop-
erative or incapable of being performed,’ Art. II(3), or (ii) if the
dispute does not concern ‘a subject matter capable of settlement
by arbitration,’ Art. II(1).”29 Articles III and IV, on the other hand,
apply post-arbitration, providing for the enforcement of an
award.30 Article V, also applies post-arbitration, providing a list of
seven circumstances in which a court may refuse to recognize and
enforce an award, among which that an arbitration award may
not be enforced “if an arbitration award is ‘contrary to the public
policy of [a] country’ called upon to enforce it.”31
C. Bautista v. Star Cruises
Bautista v. Star Cruises represents one of the first cases in
which the Eleventh Circuit chose to enforce a foreign arbitration
agreement in a crewmember’s employment contract.32 While the
results of this case would be limited to the enforcement of such
clauses against crewmembers from the Philippines, Bautista rep-
resents the first step in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudence that
would result in the deprivation of U.S. statutory rights of not just
Filipino, but all crewmembers.
Excision of the FAA Seaman’s Arbitration Exception from the New York Convention
Act, 41 TEX. INT’L L. J. 103, 106 (2003)).
25. Nickson, supra note 24, at 104 n. 3.
26. Rory Bahadur, Constitutional History, Federal Arbitration And Seamen’s
Rights Sinking in a Sea of Sweatshop Labor, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157 (2008).
27. Daniel M. Schwarz, A Regression From The New York Convention: Questions
Raised By Thomas v. Carnival Corporation, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2010)
(citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985)).




32. 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
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The dispute in Bautista began when the steam boiler of a
cruise ship, owned by the defendant, exploded while the vessel
was docked in the Port of Miami.33 Of the crewmember plaintiffs
in the suit, six were killed in the explosion and four were injured.34
As Filipino crewmembers, the content of their employment con-
tracts had been regulated by a Filipino state agency, the Philip-
pine Overseas Employment Administration.35 Included in the
state-crafted contracts was an arbitration clause that required
arbitration in any “cases of claims and disputes arising from [the
seamen’s] employment.”36
While Bautista would be the catalyst for substantial litigation
over crewmember arbitration in the late 2000s, the principal argu-
ment in the case was different than its progeny. In Bautista, the
plaintiffs argued that Section 1 of the FAA had exempted seamen,
such as themselves, from the enforcement of foreign arbitration
agreements, generally enforced by the Convention Act.37 This
exemption provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen.”38 However, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit disagreed, holding that the Section 1 exemption under the
FAA conflicted with the Convention Act and was therefore inap-
plicable.39 In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the rea-
soning of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Francisco v. Stolt
Achievement and foreclosed any challenge to foreign arbitration
clauses under the FAA Section 1 seamen exemption.40
D. Thomas v. Carnival Corp.
After Bautista, cruise lines began to apply foreign arbitration
clauses to the employment contracts of all foreign crewmembers.
This practice persisted with approval from the district courts41
until the 2009 decision of Thomas v. Carnival Corp., which
returned substantial protection to foreign crewmembers.42 How-
33. Id. at 1292.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1293.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1296.
38. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
39. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1292; see also Wales, supra note 24, at 1227.
40. Baustista, 396 F.3d at 1299 (citing Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293
F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002)).
41. See e.g., Allen v. Royal Caribbean Cruise, Ltd., No. 08-22014, 2008 U.S. Dist.
WL 5095412 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2008); Lathan v. Carnival Corp., No. 08-23002, 2009
WL 6340059 (S.D. April 9, 2009).
42. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1113 (11th Cir. 2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-1\IAL106.txt unknown Seq: 9 12-FEB-14 10:29
2013] LOST AT SEA 179
ever, Thomas represented a substantial break, not only from the
Eleventh Circuit’s application of foreign arbitration clauses, but
also from that of many of the court’s sister circuits.43 As a result,
the Thomas opinion became the point of considerable analysis,
drawing both criticism and praise from the legal community.44 The
Thomas opinion represents an effort by the Eleventh Circuit to
return the statutory rights that had been chipped away and even-
tually denied to foreign crewmembers since the court’s Bautista
opinion.
In Thomas, the plaintiff was employed as a waiter on a Carni-
val ship that flew a Panamanian flag of convenience.45 During the
course of his employment, the plaintiff slipped, injuring his back,
shoulder, and leg.46 After visiting the onboard physician and tak-
ing time off to recover from his injuries multiple times, Carnival
discharged the plaintiff, finding that his injuries rendered him
unfit for his duties.47 Because Thomas received a token “medical
sign-off,” and only three months of maintenance and cure, he filed
suit in state court. Subsequently, Carnival removed the case to
federal court, where arbitration was compelled as a result of a con-
tract signed after his injury that directed all disputes to be arbi-
trated in the Philippines under Panamanian law.48
In challenging the provision, Thomas maintained that the for-
eign arbitration clause, coupled with the choice of law clause,
acted as a “prospective waiver” of his statutory rights.49 As such,
those provisions of the employment contract would be “contrary to
43. See Francisco, 293 F.3d at 270; Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547
F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891 (11th
Cir. 2007).
44. See Wales, supra note 24, at 1215 (concluding that the Thomas decision has a
limited effect on the actual plight of crewmembers); Joseph R. Brubaker & Michael P.
Daly, Twenty-Five Years of the “Prospective Waiver” Doctrine In International Dispute
Resolution: Mitsubishi’s Footnote Nineteen Comes To Life In The Eleventh Circuit, 64
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1233, 1277 (2010) (finding that the Thomas decision “provides
courts with a unique prophylactic measure to ensure the survival of U.S. statutory
policies when the application of those policies in foreign proceedings and the domestic
opportunity to review those foreign proceedings remain uncertain,” while noting that
it has left open several questions regarding the doctrine); Joseph R. Brubaker, The
Prospective Waiver Of A Statutory Claim Invalidates An Arbitration Clause: The
Eleventh Circuit Decision in Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 309,
316 (2008) (considering the unanticipated consequences of the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision).
45. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1115-16.
46. Id. at 1116.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1115-16.
49. Id. at 1115.
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public policy”50 of the U.S. and, therefore, unenforceable.51  The
court agreed with Thomas, relying on the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.52
In that case, the Supreme Court considered a similar argument, in
which the plaintiff challenged a foreign arbitration agreement on
the grounds that Sherman Act violations were not appropriate for
foreign arbitration.53 The Court rejected this argument, holding
that U.S. policy would not be violated because the parties had
agreed to apply U.S. law in the foreign arbitration proceedings.54
However, in dicta, the Court held that “[i]n the event the choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospec-
tive waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for anti-
trust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy.”55 In Thomas, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that such a “tandem” had been worked on the
plaintiff, and acted as a “prospective waiver” of Thomas’ Seaman’s
Wage Act claim, which was a U.S. statutory remedy.56 Further,
the court held that the application of Panamanian law could
potentially yield Thomas no award, leaving him with nothing to
enforce in U.S. courts, and therefore, no later opportunity for
review.57
The Thomas opinion effectively applied the “prospective
waiver” doctrine to render the arbitration agreement unenforce-
able, under Article V(2)(b) of the Convention. But the opinion
would not deter the cruise industry from applying foreign arbitra-
tion clauses to the contracts of its foreign employees. In the wake
of the Thomas opinion, the cruise lines began stipulating to the
application of U.S. law regarding a crewmember’s statutory
claims.58 This way, the cruise lines continued to subject
50. Id. (citing the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards art. V(2)(b), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517).
51. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1113 (11th Cir. 2009).
52. Id. at 1120 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 614-15 (1985)).
53. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
54. Id. at 640.
55. Id. at 652 n. 19.
56. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
57. Id. at 1123-24. (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,
515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995) (holding that a “prospective waiver” of U.S. statutory rights
is only against public policy when there is no subsequent opportunity for review by
U.S. courts to ensure that the legitimate interest in enforcing U.S. statutory law has
been addressed)).
58. See e.g., Matthews v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 728 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1328
(S.D. Fla. 2010).
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crewmembers to the inequitable practice of foreign arbitration,
without contradicting the holding of Thomas.
III. CREWMEMBER RIGHTS SINK TO NEW DEPTHS
UNDER LINDO V. NCL
The Eleventh Circuit’s Thomas decision represented a sur-
prising appeal to humanity considering the court’s previous hold-
ings enforcing arbitration clauses found in crewmember
employment contracts. While the Thomas decision did create
waves within the cruise industry, the holding would not last long.
In 2011, only two years after the Thomas opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit decided Lindo v. NCL.59 Treating the Thomas opinion as
no more than a minor indiscretion, the Lindo opinion returned to
cruise lines the authority to deprive crewmembers of their rights
by enforcing the arbitration clauses.60 While the validity of the
Lindo decision has been challenged since its release, it has con-
sistently been upheld, with each decision further deconstructing
Thomas.61 Currently, Lindo represents the most detailed interpre-
tation of the Eleventh Circuit’s position on the enforcement of
crew arbitration, and has realigned the Eleventh Circuit’s reason-
ing with its previous precedent and that of its sister circuits.62
The facts surrounding Lindo read much like most crew arbi-
tration cases brought within the Eleventh Circuit. Harold Leonel
Pineda Lindo, a Nicaraguan citizen and resident, was injured
while working on the Norwegian Cruise Line (hereinafter “NCL”)
ship, the M/S Norwegian Dawn.63 NCL maintains its principle
place of business in Miami, Florida, where it operates cruise ships
that depart from, and return to, ports in the United States.64 How-
ever, NCL is a Bermuda corporation, and the M/S Norwegian
Dawn flies a Bahamian flag of convenience.65 In December 2008,
during his employment with NCL, and within the scope of his
59. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011).
60. Id. at 1257.
61. See Williams v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 686 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2012);
Fernandes v. Carnival Corp., 484 F. App’x 361 (11th Cir. July 12, 2012); Arauz v.
Carnival Corp., 466 Fed. Appx. 815 (11th Cir. 2012).
62. See Aggarao v. MOL Shipping Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2012);
Harrington v. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2010); Rogers v.
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2008); Bautista v. Star Cruises,
396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005); Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270 (5th
Cir. 2002).
63. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1260.
64. Id.; Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 126 (2005).
65. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1260.
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employment, Lindo injured his back after being ordered to carry
heavy trash bags to the cruise ship from NCL’s privately owned
island in the Bahamas.66 Subsequently, Lindo underwent surgery
to correct the injury he sustained working for NCL.67
Lindo’s employment was governed by a collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by NCL and the Norwegian Seafarers’
Union, and specified that all Jones Act claims would be resolved
through binding arbitration, stating:
Seaman agrees . . . that any and all claims . . . relating
to or in any way connected with the Seaman’s shipboard
employment with Company including . . . claims such as
personal injuries [and] Jones Act claims . . . shall be
referred to and resolved exclusively by binding arbitration
pursuant to the United Nations Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards . . . .68
Further, Lindo’s contract required him to arbitrate any disputes
arising out of his employment in Nicaragua (Lindo’s home coun-
try), under Bahamian law (the law of the flag state of the vessel).69
In 2009, Lindo filed action against NCL in Florida state
court.70 Following routine procedure for crewmember claims, NCL
removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida and sought to compel arbitration.71 During that
time, Lindo amended his claim to allege only Jones Act negli-
gence, noting that NCL had met its maintenance and cure obliga-
tions.72 Soon after, the district court granted NCL’s motion to
dismiss the claim and compelled arbitration.73
In his decision, Judge Hull began by recognizing Supreme
Court precedent applying a “strong presumption in favor of freely-
negotiated contractual choice-of-law and forum-selection provi-
sions,” especially within the field of international commerce.74 In
his first attempt to deconstruct the Thomas decision, Judge Hull
described the two stages of enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, Hull explained
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1260-61.
69. Id. at 1261.
70. Id.
71. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2011). NCL
moved to remove the claim pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 205.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1262, 1287.
74. Id. at 1275.
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that under Article II, the first phase of arbitral enforcement is
action to compel arbitration.75 In an action to compel arbitration,
under the Convention, a court may only decline the enforcement of
an arbitration clause if it finds the agreement to be “null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”76 Again, consistent
with precedent, Hull then recognized the second stage of enforce-
ment, the action of confirming an arbitral award subsequent to
arbitration. In this second stage, Article V of the convention recog-
nizes seven defenses to the confirmation of the arbitral award,
including the one at issue in both Thomas and Lindo, that “the
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”77
Using this framework for enforceability, the court first
rejected Lindo’s argument that the employment agreement was
“null and void” because its “take-it-or-leave-the-ship basis” was
unconscionable.78 Judge Hull found that Lindo had failed to assert
any permissible defense under Article II, as Lindo was challeng-
ing the enforcement of arbitration before arbitration actually had
been compelled. Further, the court rejected the reasoning in
Thomas, on which Lindo’s argument relied, finding that the public
policy defense created by the Thomas decision was not a proper
defense under Article II.79 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Hull
criticized Thomas’ reliance on the “prospective waiver” language
of footnote 19 of Mitsubishi, dismissing footnote 19 as “undis-
putably dicta” and noting that the Supreme Court has never
invalidated an arbitration agreement on that basis.80 Rather,
Judge Hull maintained that Thomas ignored the true pro-arbitra-
tion principles on which Mitsubishi actually relied.81
In Lindo, Judge Hull also explained that Thomas ignored the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Vimar, which held that a court
should not speculate about the outcomes of arbitration at the first
stage of compelling arbitration.82 Further, Thomas ignored the
75. Id. at 1263.
76. Id. (quoting New York Convention, art. II(3)).
77. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011).
78. Id. at 1276-77.
79. Id. at 1278.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1279; see also Nicholas A. Machen, Balancing Bargaining Power: The
Eleventh Circuit Overreaches to Destroy the Public Policy Defense at the Initial
Enforcement Stage of Arbitration in Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 36 TUL. MAR. L.J.
839, 847 (2012).
82. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1279. The Lindo court determined that Thomas improperly
avoided the Vimar warning not to speculate about the outcome of an arbitration
award at the enforcement stage as it reasoned that U.S. law would never be applied in
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Vimar holding that the “prospective waiver” theory from Mitsub-
ishi should only be applied where there is no further opportunity
for review, noting that the prospect of no award existed in Vimar
as it does in every arbitration case.83 The court rejected the claim
that there was only a possibility for subsequent review if the dis-
trict court retained jurisdiction, by noting that even where a dis-
trict court has not retained jurisdiction, an action to confirm an
award may be brought as a separate action under federal law.84
Finally, the Lindo decision rejects the claim that through the
2008 Amendment to the Jones Act, Congress created a “subject-
matter exception” to the arbitrability of Jones Act claims.85 The
Amendment deleted the venue provision of the Jones Act, adopt-
ing the FELA venue provision for Jones Act claims.86 However, the
court declined to accept Lindo’s contention, that by adopting the
FELA venue provision, 45 U.S.C. § 55 of FELA, which finds any
contract attempting to limit liability under FELA to be void,
should apply as well.87
In her fiery dissent of the Lindo opinion, Judge Barkett reit-
erated the Thomas opinion, finding that the public policy defense
could be raised during the first stage of compelling arbitration,
and that the arbitration and choice of law clauses in Lindo “effec-
tuated precisely the sort of prospective statutory waiver that the
Supreme Court said it ‘would have little hesitation in condemn-
ing. . . as against public policy” in footnote 19 of Mitsubishi.88
Judge Barkett reached this conclusion by examining substantial
Supreme Court precedent that held, under contract law, that an
agreement contrary to public policy is considered to be “void,” and
therefore must be inferred from the Convention’s “null and void”
the resolution of Thomas’ claims, because the choice of law clause required the
application of Panamanian law rather than U.S. law. See also Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1286.
86. Id.
87. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1286. 45 U.S.C. § 55 (2013) reads: “Any contract, rule,
regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to
that extent be void: Provided, That in any action brought against any such common
carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter, such common
carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief
benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person
entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought.”
88. Id. at 1288.
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clause.89 Additionally, Judge Barkett notes that the “null and
void” clause of Article II was left deliberately broad, as it was
“drafted in a race against time. . . inserted in the closing days of
negotiations” at the New York Convention.90 Finally, after noting
the “heightened legal protections” afforded to seamen, and that
they have “always been regarded as the wards of the admiralty
court,” Judge Barkett reasoned that the enforcement of Lindo’s
NCL’s arbitration clause contravenes the public policy of the
United States, and should be denied under the “prospective
waiver” doctrine.91 In conclusion, she protested “I believe the
Supreme Court meant what it said in Mitsubishi. . . I would sim-
ply take the Supreme Court at its word, as we are required to do,
and apply the [prospective waiver] doctrine to the case before
us.”92
IV. ANALYSIS: NAVIGATING THE LAW TO RESTORE THE
JONES ACT PROTECTIONS
Moving forward, there appears to be three possible solutions
in determining the validity of arbitration clauses the cruise indus-
try has required in its employment contracts regarding Jones Act
negligence claims brought by its foreign crewmembers. First, the
crippling holding of Lindo might remain good law, allowing the
cruise industry to continue exploiting its foreign crewmembers,
leaving those who are injured while working on a cruise ship only
the option to recover through arbitration. Rejected from any
American courtroom, and with no realistic possibility to arbitrate,
a continuation of Lindo would spell disaster for the foreign
crewmember and represent an unprecedented attack on the
“wards of admiralty.”93
Alternatively, if the courts choose to recognize the plight of
the cruise line crewmember, Judge Barkett’s dissent in Lindo
could be adopted by reaffirming the court’s commitment to the
Thomas decision and the application of the Supreme Court’s “pro-
spective waiver” doctrine. However, as all of the Circuit Courts
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1289 (citing Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958:
Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 154, (1981) (quoting Gary B. Born,
International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials, 159 (2d ed.
2001)).
91. Id. at 1294-95 (citing Chandris, Inc., v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995);
Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823)).
92. Id. at 1297.
93. Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 483.
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who have heard crewmember arbitration cases have rejected the
Thomas reasoning, it would likely require the Supreme Court to
accept certiorari on the issue to either accept or reject its language
in Mitsubishi’s footnote 19.
Finally, it has been contended that the arbitration clauses
could be held void without utilizing the “prospective waiver doc-
trine.” Supreme Court precedent does demonstrate that protec-
tions under FELA should be extended to the Jones Act seaman,
which would act to render any foreign arbitration clause in a
crewmember’s employment contract void during the initial
enforcement step of the agreement to arbitrate.
A. Sticking With Lindo
Although Lindo demonstrates that the Eleventh Circuit
favors the “presumption of validity” enjoyed by foreign arbitration
clauses, over the centuries old policy of treating seamen as a pro-
tected class, it is important to note the compelling reasoning
employed by the Eleventh Circuit in reaching its decision. First,
Lindo represents a key victory for alternative dispute resolution,
and the support of foreign arbitration. Relying on Supreme Court
precedent, the court recognized that this presumption “applies
with special force in the field of international commerce.”94 In this
context, the Lindo decision can be considered as yet another step
in the broadening of the court’s policy to presume the validity of
any foreign arbitration clause.
Second, in its attempt to distinguish the two individual steps
inherent in the enforcement of an arbitration clause, the Lindo
opinion can be seen as an attempt to reaffirm the autonomy of
each step after Thomas effectively blurred the difference between
the two. Under this traditional two-stage interpretation of the
Convention, Article II and Article V demonstrate that the affirma-
tive defense of public policy may only be employed during the sec-
ond stage of enforcement, subsequent to an arbitral award.95
Through its opinion in Lindo, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its
decision to treat the affirmative defenses in Article II and Article
94. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1265 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1995); Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614, 631 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974); M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-16 (11th Cir. 1972); Bautista v. Star
Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005); Lipcon v. Corporation of Loyd’s, 148
F.3d 1285, 1292-94 (11th Cir. 1998)).
95. See Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (11th Cir.
2004).
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V procedurally separate, and declined to recognize any implicit
overlap of defenses between the two-stage of enforcement.
Finally, through Lindo, the Eleventh Circuit eliminated the
circuit split that the Thomas opinion had created.96 The elimina-
tion of the circuit split recognizes the general policy of avoiding
splits from its sister courts; it also represents a tough blow for
those advocating for crewmember rights because the Supreme
Court is unlikely to grant certiorari on a crewmember arbitration
case as long as the circuit courts are unified on the
interpretation.97
No matter how firmly rooted in law the decision may be, the
Lindo decision had undeniably detrimental effects on the rights of
foreign seaman. The Lindo opinion itself fails to take into consid-
eration the precarious position that foreign arbitration clauses
leave crewmembers in. The Eleventh Circuit, in Lindo viewed
arbitration as only a less favorable alternative for seafarers to
resolve their claims. Rather, arbitration is not merely less
favorable to seafarers as it often operates to “deprive [seafarers] of
any remedy at all.”98 Among the progeny of the Lindo decision, the
case of Fernandes v. Carnival Corp. demonstrates how many for-
eign crewmembers find themselves uncompensated once their
claims have been compelled to arbitration. Fernandes, a citizen of
India, worked as a mechanic aboard the Carnival cruise ship
SPIRIT.99 While working on the ship, he injured his back.100 After
receiving little medical treatment from the shipboard physician,
his injury was exacerbated by the continuation of work.101 Per his
arbitration agreement, Fernandes’ Jones Act claim was compelled
to arbitration in the Philippines under Bahamian law. Such
96. See Aggarao v. MOL Ship Management Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355, 355 (4th Cir.
2012); Harrington v. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 113 (2d Cir. 2010);
Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008); Francisco
v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 270 (5th Cir. 2002).
97. See United States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
“absent strong reason to do so, we will not create a direct conflict with other circuits”);
see also United States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting
“the avoidance of unnecessary circuit splits furthers the legitimacy of the judiciary
and reduces friction flowing from the application of different rules to similarly
situated individuals based solely on their geographic location”); New Orleans Depot
Servs. v. Dir., 689 F.3d 400, 409 n. 6 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that circuit splits should
be avoided unless persuasive reasons exist for creating them).
98. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *25, Fernandes v. Carnival Corp., No. 12-456
(U.S. Oct. 9, 2012), 2012 WL 4842991.
99. Id. at *7.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *7-8.
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enforcement left Fernandes with no realistic opportunity to seek
recovery, as “[h]is salary of $1,500 a month will never allow him to
fly the 3,000 miles from his home in India to the Philippines for an
arbitration hearing. And, even if he could get there, no one in the
Philippines would know Bahamian law anyway (except, of course,
such version of Bahamian law as Carnival’s lawyers might pre-
sent).”102 Under Lindo, Fernandes, Lagarde, and their peers, are
not given a less favorable alternative to seek recovery through
arbitration. Their rights as a “protected class” are ignored and
they are often left entirely uncompensated.
B. Returning to the “Prospective Waiver” Doctrine
In searching for a legal argument that might better protect
the rights of the foreign seaman, the most obvious answer calls for
a return to the Thomas decision and the adoption of the Supreme
Court’s “prospective waiver” doctrine. In employing this doctrine,
the most compelling argument and implementation can be found
in Judge Barkett’s dissent in Lindo.103 However, while Barkett’s
attack on the majority’s interpretation of the Convention Act,
Article II(3) “null and void” provision is compelling, currently, a
return to the “prospective waiver” doctrine would seem unlikely.
Absent a revival of the doctrine by the Supreme Court, the Elev-
enth Circuit, through Lindo and its progeny have all but laid the
application of Mitsubishi’s footnote 19 to rest as it applies to
crewmember arbitration claims. While unlikely now, if a circuit
that has not yet become entrenched in Lindo’s precedent were to
adopt Thomas, such a circuit split might give the Supreme Court
an opportunity to resurrect footnote 19. Until such resurrection,
footnote 19 will not provide relief to any foreign crewmembers of
the cruise industry, and it will be necessary to look to an alterna-
tive argument.
C. Can FELA Provide Hope to Foreign Crewmembers
Condemned to Arbitration?
Although the adoption of the “prospective waiver” theory has
been consistently rejected by the circuit courts and would now
require the Supreme Court to definitively uphold its language in
footnote 19 of Mitsubishi, there exists another legal avenue that
could protect the rights of foreign crewmembers from the inequity
102. Id. at *25.
103. See discussion supra Part III.
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of foreign arbitration. While not the focus of the Lindo opinion,
this legal theory was given summary treatment in that case, when
the Eleventh Circuit quickly discarded the argument before con-
cluding the opinion.104 This argument, which the Eleventh Circuit
should give more than a passing glance, holds that Congress cre-
ated a “subject matter exemption,” rendering Jones Act claims
prohibited from arbitration.105 Historically, the Court has recog-
nized many provisions of FELA.106 If the court were to specifically
find that 45 U.S.C. § 55,107 a provision of FELA that renders any
contract void that attempts to limit the liability of FELA employee
applied to the Jones Act, that provision would act to prevent the
enforcement of foreign arbitration clauses against foreign
crewmembers.108
The application of FELA protections to the Jones Act is not a
novel argument. Modeled after FELA, the Jones Act expressly
provides that, “Laws of the United State regulating recovery for
personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an
action under this section.”109 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
held that the Jones Act, “expressly provides for seamen the cause
of action—and consequently the entire judicially developed doc-
trine of liability—granted to railroad workers by the FELA.”110
More recently, the Court has held that “[t]he Jones Act establishes
a uniform system of seamen’s tort law parallel to that available to
employees of interstate railway carriers under FELA.”111
The principal contention against the application of 45 U.S.C.
§ 55 has come from the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Terrebone v. K-
Sea Trans. Corp.112 In that case, the court found that 45 U.S.C.
104. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1286 (11th Cir. 2011).
105. Id.
106. Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958).
107. 45 U.S.C. § 55 (2013) (stating “Any contract, rule, regulation, or device
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to
exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void:
Provided, That in any action brought against any such common carrier under or by
virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter, such common carrier may set off therein
any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that
may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account
of the injury or death for which said action was brought.”).
108. See Harrington v. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 113 (2d Cir. 2010);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 98, at *13.
109. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2008).
110. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 426; see also American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.
443, 456 (1994); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 98, at *16-17.
111. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 29 (1990); see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 98, at *17.
112. Terrebonne v. K-Sea Trans. Corp., 477 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 2007).
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§ 55 could not be exported to the Jones Act because the adoption of
the FELA venue provision would be inappropriate, as the Jones
Act included its own venue provision.113 However, since the Ter-
rebone decision, in 2008 the venue provision of the Jones Act was
repealed.114 But, even after the 2008 amendment, the Lindo opin-
ion determined that those FELA provisions still did not apply,
favoring instead the common law applications of the previously
codified Jones Act venue provision.115
In his dissent from Harrington v. Atlantic Sounding, Judge
Calabresi addresses the “historic importance and purpose of both
the Jones Act and FELA, and of their unique protections for spe-
cific categories of workers, such as seamen,” that the Lindo opin-
ion ignores.116 In his opinion, Judge Calabresi found that the
“long-established precedent” in applying FELA protections to
Jones Act seamen required the Second Circuit to find the arbitra-
tion agreement void.117 First, Calabresi points out that 46 U.S.C.
§ 30104 explicitly states that “Laws of the United States regulat-
ing recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee
apply to an action under this section,” which the Supreme Court
has established functions to adopt “the entire judicially developed
doctrine of liability under [FELA].”118 The dissent relies heavily on
Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad, which considered the
enforceability of a forum-selection clause signed by a railway
worker that required all disputes to be brought in Michigan.119
There the Supreme Court rejected the forum-selection clause,
finding that a FELA governed contract limiting a plaintiff’s choice
of venue violates FELA section 5 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55).120
Then, Judge Calabresi pokes further holes in the majority’s rea-
soning, and that of Lindo, by citing compelling authority indicat-
113. Id. at 281.
114. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.L. No.
110–181, § 3521(a), 122 Stat. 3, 596 (2008) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104)
(eliminating 46 U.S.C. § 30104(b) (2007), providing “VENUE. – An action under this
section shall be brought in the judicial district in which the employer resides or the
employer’s principal office is located”).
115. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011)
(specifically noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384
U.S. 202 (1966)).
116. Harrington v. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Calabresi, J. dissenting).
117. Id. at 134.
118. Id. at 133 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30104; American Dredging Co., 443 U.S. at
456).
119. Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949).
120. Id. at 266.
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ing that Boyd directly applies to the Jones Act as well.121 Finally,
Judge Calabresi noted that as an arbitration clause acts to limit
the forum in which a plaintiff may bring suit, “[a]n agreement to
arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect a special kind of
forum-selection clause.”122 In failing to extend Boyd, Calabresi rea-
soned that the majority neglected the Congressional intent to give
the “disadvantaged workmen some leverage,” not only under
FELA, but also under the Jones Act.123
Further, the Supreme Court made clear in Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell that the substantive protec-
tions of FELA should not be supplanted by the general policy
favoring arbitration.124 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
an arbitration clause found within the employment contract of a
railroad worker was not enforceable, stating:
We find no merit in this argument. . . .This Court has, on
numerous occasions, declined to hold that individual
employees are, because of the availability of arbitration,
barred from bringing claims under federal statutes. [cita-
tions omitted]. Although the analysis of the question under
each statute is quite distinct, the theory running through
these cases is that notwithstanding the strong policies
encouraging arbitration, “different considerations apply
where the employee’s claim is based on rights arising out of
a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guar-
antees to individual workers.125
As Congress intended, the Jones Act is a statute designed to pro-
vide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers, just
as FELA was.126
Similar to Judge Barkett’s dissent in Lindo, Judge Calabresi’s
dissent in Harrington recognizes the realities inherent in the
enforcement of foreign arbitration clauses against Jones Act
121. Harrington, 602 F.3d at 134-35 (Calabresi, J. dissenting) (citing Cal. Pub.
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 99 (2d Cir. 2004); Nunez v. Am.
Seafoods, 52 P.3d 720 (Ala. 2002).
122. Harrington, 602 F.3d at 135 (Calabresi, J. dissenting) (quoting Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros,
S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534 (1995) (holding that foreign arbitration
clauses are a subset of foreign forum selection clauses in general).
123. Harrington, 602 F.3d at 136 (Calabresi, J. dissenting) (quoting Miles v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 707-08 (1942)); see also Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S.
347, 354 (1995) (noting the Congressional intent to provide seamen “heightened legal
protections” through the Jones Act).
124. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
125. Id. at 564-65.
126. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2008).
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seamen. Calabresi debunks the reasoning applied by both the
Harrington majority, and the Lindo majority, revealing that
neither court was required to hold that 45 U.S.C. § 55 did not
apply to Jones Act claims. Rather, the courts chose to neglect the
viable option of applying § 55 to Jones Act claims, such as Lindo’s
or Harrington’s, in an effort to find that the policy of favoring for-
eign arbitration supersedes the “heightened legal protections”
that seamen enjoy, which have stood the test of time and have
been consistently reaffirmed by the modern Supreme Court. As
such arbitration clauses would not be enforceable against FELA
railroad employees, Congressional intent and Supreme Court pre-
cedent would demand similar treatment for sailors under the
Jones Act.127 Until the Eleventh Circuit grants these FELA protec-
tions to Jones Act seamen, the reality of foreign arbitration will
continue to prevent cruise line employees from receiving fair com-
pensation for injuries they received while serving as a supposed
“protected class.”
V. CONCLUSION
As the law currently stands, there is little hope that Lagarde
will receive his day in a U.S. courtroom or receive the statutory
protections entitled to him under U.S. law. Instead, like those that
have come before him, Lagarde has been condemned to arbitration
under another nation’s law where crewmembers receive far less
for the injuries they have sustained.128 By repeatedly affirming the
Lindo decision, the Eleventh Circuit continues to entrench its
position on these foreign sailors: that the promotion of interna-
tional arbitration is more important than defending this “pro-
tected class” from the inherent dangers of seamanship that have
been recognized for centuries. Perhaps Judge Barkett said it best
in her dissent, where she criticized the Lindo majority for “effec-
tively transform[ing] the enforcement of international arbitration
agreements into the top U.S. public policy.”129
While the circuit courts continue to embrace Lindo, any hope
of rehabilitating the rights of the foreign crewmember will likely
require the Supreme Court to correct the lower courts’ interpreta-
127. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 98, at *28.
128. Although Lagarde was denied the opportunity to seek compensation for his
injury in an American courtroom and has been subjected to arbitration governed by
Panamanian law, Lagarde was more fortunate than others, as he was provided
arbitration in his home country of the Philippines.
129. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1294 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added).
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tion. Recently, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to do
just that, when it considered a petition for a writ of certiorari on
the Eleventh Circuit case of Fernandes v. Carnival Corp.130 That
case provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to address the
validity of adopting FELA to render the arbitration clauses of for-
eign seamen void, which served as a principal argument raised by
the petitioner.131 But the rights of foreign seamen appear to be lost
a while longer, as the Court denied the petition for certiorari on
Fernandes.132 Although this injustice may not yet be “ripe” for
review, eventually the Court must consider the degradation of its
own precedent to defend seamen as the “wards of admiralty” in
the name of international arbitration.133
The devastating condition in which foreign crewmembers
injured at sea find themselves  demonstrates precisely why Amer-
ican courts have consistently protected seamen as “wards of admi-
ralty.” With those protections nullified in the face of international
arbitration, Lagarde and his peers suffer the same injuries our
courts have guarded against since Harden. In 1823, Justice Story
knew this was an unacceptable result. Today, the disregard of for-
eign seamen’s rights remains an unacceptable result. Neither
Judge Barkett’s call to return to the “prospective waiver” doctrine
in her dissent in Lindo, nor Judge Calabresi’s call to further adopt
FELA into the Jones Act in his dissent in Harrington represent a
“perfect fit” to return foreign seamen their Jones Act rights. How-
ever, few legal doctrines exist absent rational legal arguments
against them. And until the legacy of the Lindo opinion is over-
turned, many more foreign seamen will suffer this unacceptable
result despite being members of a “protected class.” The applica-
tion of 45 U.S.C. § 55 to the Jones Act deserves the attention of
our courts, and represents the most compelling argument to gain
the correct result: welcoming cruise line crewmembers back to
American courtrooms.
130. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 98, at *25; see also Fernandes v.
Carnival Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14270 (July 12, 2012).
131. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 98, at *25.
132. Order List: 4/15/13, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/041513zor_p86b.pdf (last visited May 26, 2013).
133. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
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